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This article presents an historical and conceptual overview on diﬀerent approaches to logical abstraction.
Two main trends concerning abstraction in the history of logic are highlighted, starting from the logical
notions of concept and function. This analysis strictly relates to the philosophical discussion on the nature
of abstract objects. I develop this issue further with respect to the procedure of abstraction involved by
(typed) l-systems, focusing on the crucial change about meaning and predicability. In particular, the
analysis of the nature of logical types in the context of Constructive Type Theory allows elucidation of the
role of the previously introduced notions. Finally, the connection to the analysis of abstraction in
computer science is drawn, and the methodological contribution provided by the notion of information is
considered, showing its conceptual and technical relevance. Future research shall focus on the notion of
information in distributed systems, analysing the paradigm of information hiding in dependent type
theories.
1. Introduction
Abstraction is one of the core notions in both ancient and modern formal
logic. As a central subject for any philosophical approach to logic, its historical
development is fascinating from various perspectives.
A fair amount of scholarly work, especially in linguistics and metaphysics, has
been produced concerning the nature of abstract entities and abstract objects, both
with respect to theories of Universals in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and to more
recent systematic and formal approaches.1 Abstraction, intended as a logical
procedure, is the other side of the coin. This issue arises from the development of
modern logic and today it plays a relevant role in mathematics and computer science.
The basic distinction between ‘abstraction’ and ‘abstract’ spreads across the history
of logic, starting with the ancient Greeks, and since then has presented a number of
overlapping and continuosly changing readings. The aim of the present article is to
provide an overview of the links between two main readings of logical abstraction: I
shall refer, on the one hand, to the ‘bottom–up’ process of abstraction based on
predication; on the other, to its counterpart, the ‘top–down’ model based on the
elucidation of meanings.
This task is accomplished by introducing this basic distinction at the origin of
logic with reference to Plato and Aristotle, and reconsidering the change induced by
medieval commentators (section 2). The next step is represented by the analysis of the
ﬁrst paradigmatic interpretation of abstraction due to modern logic, namely via the
introduction of the notion of function and its translation into the notion of
logical type (section 3). The aim is to reach the analysis of abstraction provided
1 See for example Hart 1979, Bealer 1982, Ku¨nne 1982, Ku¨nne 1983, Zalta 1983, Hale 1987, Campbell 1990, Bacon 1995,
Lowe 1995.
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by the various versions of l-systems (sections 4 and 5), in order to present the
appropriate interpretation of this notion in procedural semantics (section 6 and 7)
and to explain a new methodological view, based on epistemic information
(section 8).
2. At the origins of abstraction
A philosophical outlook on the formal procedures of abstraction can start
nowhere else than from the ﬁrst steps in logic.
The ﬁrst formulation of a theory of abstract terms in the history of philosophy is
probably Plato’s Theory of Ideas, on the basis of which the ﬁrst (coherently
presented) epistemology of the history of philosophy is built. The missing formal
presentation of such a theory can be extracted from diﬀerent passages of the Platonic
dialogues. Notoriously, the nature of the most general Forms, the related problem of
how does one get to know them, and their connection to existing (concrete) objects,
are the essential features of Plato’s theory of knowledge and of his metaphysics.2 The
element of Plato’s philosophy that is crucial to the issue of the present analysis is the
conceptual priority of Ideas over the material objects realizing them: Forms exist
explicitly separated from all the particulars. The latter are thus determined in their
essence by their partaking of the former, which implies in turn the inherence of
Forms to existents. For this, a passage from the Phaedo (100a–101e) remains
illuminating:
I think that if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is beautiful for no
other reasons than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to
everything. [. . .] I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this that
nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you
please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in
which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that
beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty.
This relation of partaking (i.e. the combined relation given as parousa and
Koinona), the intertwining of particular and general Forms, is notoriously diﬃcult to
explicate, and the present article will not try to formulate a new thesis on this topic.
The reference to Plato’s Theory of Ideas is intended as a shortcut to present the
connection between abstraction and knowledge, instantiated as a relation of
predication. This view in the context of Platonic metaphysics and ontology is
emphasized by the fact that the general Forms are considered in their relation to
concrete objects with respect to the central topic of judgment-formation. Platonic
Ideas are standard paradigms, to which individuals conform, and this appears
manifestly in the fomulation of correct judgments.3 Despite the obvious connection
that Platonic Forms bear to judgments and predicative Forms, the disentanglement
of their formal relation is a diﬃcult one, and the theory of judgments was never
explicitly considered by Plato as the logical tertium between abstracts and their terms.
Such clariﬁcation comes only with the Copernican turn due to the Aristotelian
explanation of the relation between objects and abstract terms: it consisted of
2 Probably the most complete reference for Plato’s Theory of Ideas is still Ross 1971.
3 See e.g. Theaetetus 201d–202c and Republic, 476a.
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abandoning the ontological priority of the general Forms over their participating
individuals, and assuming explicitly the relation of predication as the basis for
deﬁning abstraction. Aristotle maintains that the logical relation of predication is the
starting point for any account of the Categories, intended as the Forms of both what
there is and of what can be said.4 Under such reading, the notion of general form is
translated into that of a category of predication; as a speciﬁcation of the latter, a
general predication will make explicit the relation of an individual to a substance
(oŁ’sı´a), the ﬁrst category to which the others refer. This implies that the relation
between terms in an act of predication and categories proceeds in the opposite
direction than in Plato, and the analysis of predicative expressions amounts to a
proper abstraction procedure, rather than to the relation between abstract terms and
their instances. The Aristotelian understanding of abstraction can be formulated in
terms of the main thesis that abstract methods (or abstraction procedures) are
methodologically distinct from abstract terms, considered as entities with some
ontological status. These distinct modes of abstraction can be recollected as follows
in Aristotelian terms:
. The notion of universal (Ka#o´lou);
. The notion of object produced by (a method of) abstraction (ta` Çx jareseo&
lego´mena, e$ n jaresei, di jareseo&, jarein).
The ﬁrst mode of abstraction exempliﬁes universal predication. Its deﬁnition refers to
the classical form of judgment ‘P belongs (łpþrwein) to S’, for which one says that P
belongs universally to S if:
. The predicate P belongs to every instance of the subject S;
. That P belonging to S is due to S itself in that it is an S (in virtue of S and
qua S), i.e. not by accident.
A universal is identiﬁed with a predicable satisfying the two previous conditions.5
On the other hand, the idea of (a method of) abstraction (by which a certain
abstract term is produced) corresponds to a removal operation.6 This idea is
formulated in the general logical context of the Analytics in terms of the operation of
removing particular predicates, namely those not falling under the previously given
description of the universal. The removal operation preserves only the basic or
deﬁnitional predicates for the subject at hand (its deﬁning categories): for example, it
considers perceptible magnitudes qua lengths, and this corresponds to proceeding
from the particular to the more general of the categories.7 This procedure leads to
concept-formation by means of classiﬁcation of the properties belonging to objects or
entities, and thus provides their hierarchy of universality. Moreover, this procedure
of determining the universals starting from particulars is crucial because it deﬁnes the
demonstrative process:
4 Aristotle, Categories, par. 2.
5 For this explanation see e.g.Metaphysics B, 4, 1000a1; , 9, 1017b 35; Z, 13, 1038b11–13; Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73b
26–74a 3.
6 The standard example is given in Physics, in terms of perceptibles deﬁned as physical magnitudes, something which by
nature can be added or removed. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Book 3.
7 See e.g. Posterior Analytics, I, 18, 81b 3–7 and Metaphysics, M 2, 1077b 10.
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[. . .] demonstration does not necessarily imply the being of Forms nor a One
beside a Many, but it does necessarily imply the possibility of truly predicating
one of many; since without this possibility we cannot save the universal and if the
universal goes, the middle term goes with it, and so demonstration becomes
impossible.8
As it appears by this short analysis, the distinction between formal procedures of
abstraction and abstract entities (concepts) is fully developed in the Aristotelian
framework of predication. In such a paradigm, the notion of concept is the abstract
entity obtained by progressive universalization of predications, and this surely
conﬂicts with the Platonic approach according to which abstract terms are
ontologically anterior to their use in predication.
Predication is, therefore, the pivotal notion to look at for an understanding of
abstraction. This strategy is at hand in the ante rem/in re distinction for universals
with respect to particulars introduced in Middle Ages. The relation between general
names and particular existing entities, ﬁrst considered by Plato and examined at
length for example in his Parmenides,9 is one of the legacies bequeathed to the Middle
Ages. Porphyry in his Isagoge, or introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, considered
the problem of Universals explicitly.10
Boethius discussed it in his Commentaries on Porphyry’s Introduction, very much
in the Aristotelian vein of mental abstraction, whereas in the De consolatione
philosophiae he reﬂects a more Platonic approach of innate ideas as memories of
previous existence. Abelard, on the other hand, maintained that Ideas pre-exist the
creation as patterns which determine divine Providence in creating the best of the
possible worlds (a thesis known as exemplarism).11
But the most relevant inﬂuence on the theory of universals, and a turning point in
the history of abstraction, is the formulation of the semantic theory of suppositio.
Ockham’s interpretation is surely among the most relevant ones, based on a notion of
generality from which a theory of abstract entities was derived. Notoriously, the theory
of supposition provides a semantic treatment for the property of terms in a sentence,
which is the context of semantic validity of a categorematic term in a proposition.12
Ockham made use of this powerful tool in connection with the theory of universals,
in order to consider the relation between categorematic and syncategorematic
8 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 11, 77a 5–9.
9 The dialogue between Zeno, Parmenides and Socrates having as a subject the Zenonian doctrine that ‘things are many’
ﬁnds an obvious and direct connection to the relation of particulars with the Forms; see e.g. Parmenides, 127 d6–e4.
10 From the Introduction of the Isagoge:
I shall not say anything about whether genera and species exist as substances, or are conﬁned to mere
conceptions; and if they are substances, whether they are material or immaterial; and whether they exist
separately from sensible objects, or in them immanently. This sort of problem is very deep, and requires a more
extensive investigation. But I shall now try to show you that the ancients, and especially the Aristotelians, had
very reasonable theories about these [genus and species] and the others I mentioned [speciﬁc diﬀerence, exclusive
property, accident].
A complete and satisfactory overview of the diﬀerent doctrines about universal starting with Porphyry’s explanation is
given in Aaron 1953.
11 See for example Brower & Guilfoy 2004, especially the chapters Logic by C.J. Martin and Metaphysics by P. King.
12 Usually it has been simply identiﬁed with the modern theory of reference. Nowadays this identiﬁcation has been
limited or even rejected. For a modern logical interpretation of the theory of supposition see e.g. Dutilh Novaes 2007.
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terms13: Do universal terms have signiﬁcation proper to themselves? Ockham
maintains that a term which supposits generally in a proposition (i.e. under the
speciﬁcation of the syncategorematic ‘all’) supposits for every term contained in the
appellative domain determined by the general noun. In paragraphs 6–8 of his Summa
Logicae,14 he states that each of two names which are respectively the abstract and the
concrete of the same concept (e.g. humanity-man, animality-animal, hotness-heat and
so on) are not synonymous, i.e. they do not supposit for the same thing and what is
predicated of one of them cannot also be predicated of the other one.
This amounts, in turn, to formulating the problem of predication for general abstract
and concrete terms in relation tomeaning: abstract and concrete names can be equivalent
in signiﬁcation to several expressions, and generality of reference must ultimately be
secured by the categorematic terms embedded in general propositions, rather than by
expressions like ‘some’ and ‘every’ that introduce them. Thus, identity of meaning is
established in termsof their deﬁnitions, and therefore appealing to their supposita simplex:
[. . .] every universal is one particular thing and [. . .] is not a universal except in its
signiﬁcation, in its signifying many things.15
According to Ockham’s nominalism, the referents of terms render the distinction
between universal and particulars, whereas there exists a common suppositum or
meaning determined as an aﬀection of the soul. This is also conﬁrmed by the thesis
that a concrete term, being a predicate in a proposition, supposits for a form, as
‘white’ for ‘whiteness’ in ‘Socrates is white’.16 The interesting thesis held by Ockham
is therefore that the term in the universal form introduces the context of semantic
validity in any case of predication in which the same name is used in the concrete
form: this also means that universals are applicable to concrete things insofar as these
resemble each other and the concept resembles each of them.
For Aristotle the nature of abstract terms (concepts) is obtained by a procedure
of removal from the concrete predications, a position that ﬁnds variants in Averroes,
Aquinas and Scotus. By introducing explicitly the semantic relation of supposition in
this context, Ockham describes an abstract term as allowing those concrete
predications to be formulated by displaying the context of semantic validity in
which they can be performed, thus working as their logical presupposition. The
relation of conceptual priority and hierarchy of predication is thus clearly at the basis
of a full clariﬁcation of the nature of abstraction.
A double path emerged in this evolution of the notion of abstraction: on the one
hand, the role of predication; on the other, the notion of meaning. In the following, I
shall refer to abstraction in this double acception: either as process of removal, based
on predication; or as abstract term, meaning-determiner for possible predications.
This double acception of the term ‘abstraction’ shows the conceptual shift from the
metaphysical interpretation of abstract terms to the procedural semantics, which are
at the core of the logical procedures known today from mathematics and computer
science. The present analysis does not aim to show a conceptual priority of the one
13 The counterparts of Aristotelian categories and of modern logical constants.
14 In Ockham 1349 these paragraphs are titled respectively: ‘On concrete and abstract names that are synonyms’, ‘The
correct account of abstract and concrete names’ and ‘On the third mode of concrete and abstract names’.
15 Ockham 1349, par. 14, p. 78.
16 Ockham 1349, par. 63, p. 189.
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explanation over the other, nor to establish any metaphysical claim of validity for
one of them. For this reason, I do not claim that one of the two approaches deserves
the denomination ‘abstraction’ better than the other one, and I shall use the term
‘abstraction’ in both cases, specifying – when needed – which of the two acceptions is
referred to. I will show how, in the history of logic, the interpretation of abstraction
converges with respect to the problems of predication and meaning highlighted up to
now, preserving the dichotomy between a result-based and a process-based
approach, and where the procedural approach has progressively taken over,
providing a complete and uniﬁed insight to the general problem of abstraction.
3. From functions to types
One of the most important conceptual changes for which modern logic has been
responsible is the Fregean representation of beurteilbare Inha¨lte (judgeable contents)
distinct from the related acts of assertion in a formal language, obtained by the
introduction of the turnstile sign in the Begriﬀsschrift. The resulting new framework
stresses the essential role of predication in the deﬁnition of concepts; moreover, it
provides a completely new (logical) form for the notion of abstract terms. This latter
step is the most interesting element for the evolution of the notion of abstraction: it
leads to the notion of function as representing logical predication. Its most important
consequence is obviously the connection to the problem of impredicativity and the
development of the hierarchy of predications: this is the next step in our analysis,
namely the comparison between abstract terms and the invention of logical types. In
what follows, I shall investigate how these well-known events from the history of
logic are intertwined with the notion of abstraction referred to in the analysis of the
previous section.
The Fregean approach represents a direct critique of the Aristotelian under-
standing of abstraction as the determination of a unity among many separated
enitites. The connection between abstraction and function in the Begriﬀsschrift is
given in terms of a generic form of the Abstraction Principle. This principle implies in
Frege’s successive works two forms of conceptual abstraction. The ﬁrst is expressed
by the Fregean deﬁnition of number:
Deﬁnition 1 (Hume’s Principle) For any two concepts F and G, if F and G stay in a one-
to-one correspondence, then they are to be associated with the same number:
]xFx ¼ ]xGx $ Fx x;y Gy: ð1Þ
The second form is the extensional abstraction represented by Law V of the
Grundgesteze der Arithmetik, i.e. the schema:
Deﬁnition 2 (Basic Law V) Given a function f(x), let its extension be {x j f(x)}, and given
a function g(x) let its extension be {x j g(x)}; then it holds f¼ g iﬀ 8x(f(x)$ g(x)),
notoriously leading to contradiction by Russell’s Paradox.
Conceptual abstraction becomes a failing procedure in that it allows concepts and
their properties to be ‘given independently of the objects that are abstracted from
them’.17 Abstracts and concepts determine each other in a way that makes it diﬃcult
17 Fine 2008, p. 2.
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to separate the abstraction on concepts and the conceptualization of objects.
The two principles of conceptual abstraction in Frege’s work exemplify this
problem:
1. Looking at abstracts as equivalence classes replaced the quest for a purely
logical deﬁnition of the sort of abstract objects that such principles deﬁne;
2. using extensions to deﬁne functions reduces abstracts to concretes, but it
necessitates disposing entirely of such extensions, forgetting about the required
substituition procedures on the place-holders of the functional expression.
This formulation of the abstraction principle(s) makes abstract objects essentially
rely on purely logical grounds, namely properties (size, and thus cardinality) of the
corresponding models, and it allows one to identify the crucial requirements for truth
on abstraction: equivalence of concepts and a non-circular identity criterion.18 The
abstraction principles give coherent and logically admissible grounds for deﬁning
(ontologically justiﬁed) abstract terms (in second-order logic for abstraction on
concepts). Nonetheless, the holistic view on predicables shows it is a high price to pay.
The structure of Hume’s Principle essentially allows one to refer to the extension
of a concept only for a countable number of objects. On the other hand, it can be
claimed of both principles that the nature of their conditions for truth on abstraction
is essentially the deﬁning principle for functions, as this notion was introduced by
Frege: if in an expression a simple or compound sign has one or more occurrences
and that sign is recognized as replaceable in all of its occurrences by some other sign,
the invariant part is then a function and the replaceable part is its argument.19 With
respect to the Fregean interpretation of abstraction, the priority relation between the
criteria deﬁning the predication relation and the (very same) properties as attributes
of the resulting abstracts is crucial. In other words, Fregean abstraction requires,
once again, explaining abstraction from either one of two viewpoints: as removal
procedure or as meaning–determiner, now turned into – respectively – functional
semantics versus ontological properties. The Aristotelian procedural ontology has
turned into the functional determination of Sinn and Bedeutung, whereas the
medieval ontological semantics became the Fregean third realm of abstracts: as a
result, the Fregean abstracts are neither only the result of a removal operation in the
Aristotelian way, nor just the term which settles the semantic range of validity for
predications, in the Ockhamian style. The idea of deﬁnition by means of either form
of abstraction, and the essential reducibility of Hume’s Law to extensional
abstraction, are the crucial elements for determining the conceptual priority between
predication and abstract terms.
The Fregean functional structure as predicative model, obtained by the removal of
the non-deﬁnitionally relevant parts of the predication, is meant to preserve semantic
validity via the development of the theory of sense and reference. The concept
18 The two corresponding formal criteria are clariﬁed in Fine 2008, pp. 9–11, in the following terms: tenability, to take the
universe of objects from which abstraction is formulated as a set with the related model and truth for that model;
stability, to take a statement as true when it is such in all models of a suﬃciently large cardinality. In the following I
will extend the methodological analysis, further pointing at the logical diﬀerence of this realistic view on abstract terms
with respect to a procedural notion of abstraction.
19 Frege 1879, x9.
Proceeding in Abstraction 263
resulting by abstracting from an instance of a function20 is the Bedeutung of a
predicative expression.21 In the substitution of the classical judgmental form ‘S is
P/P belongs to S’ with the new functional structure F(x), the role of the evaluation
on x (the variable representing a place-holder for it) is therefore central. To build
up a judgment means essentially to evaluate a concept for an argument by verifying
the course of values of the related functional expression. According to Frege,
therefore, a concept cannot play the role of the reference of the grammatical
subject: it has to be converted into (or represented by) an object, which allows for
its evaluation.
The structural remarks on the role of functions and objects do not lead to the
very next step in the history of abstraction. The Fregean theory interpreting concepts
as predicates with sense and reference under satisfaction of the appropriate
evaluation procedure does not imply that predicates have to be logically possible:
the existence of an object instantiating a self-contradictory predicate is obviously a
completely diﬀerent matter. Under the explanation of abstraction based on the
notion of function, the Fregean non-deterministic semantics still overcomes a purely
procedural view, claiming priority for the ontological status of abstracts.22 Fregean
abstraction in the form of functions mantains conceptual priority of abstract terms
over their instances, but it is restricted by requiring fulﬁllment on the argument-place
in order to give rise to proper evaluation for certain objects relativised to the domain
at hand. The formal deﬁnition by abstraction of the old-fashioned notion of concept
is therefore obtained by determining a class of given objects deﬁned by the function,
satisfying an equivalence relation R such that reﬂexivity, identity and transitivity
hold on the objects that are members of the class. Such a deﬁnition for functional
expressions has to specify their ranges of values only by means of terms for which
they can be evaluated (the mentioned relativisation of the domain): this produces the
notion of a function as corresponding to its extension, namely the correlation of
arguments and values.23 For a concept intended as an abstract term (represented by
the function with the empty place-holder), its range corresponds to the usual logical
extension, i.e. the set of objects that can positively evaluate it.24
20 The well-known structure according to which a predicate in the form of a function is an unsaturated object, whereas
the formulation of an argument represents the instantiation of a concept making the former saturated. See Frege 1891,
p. 6, 16.
21 Frege 1892a. Notoriously, Frege establishes the referents of singular terms to be the objects they stand for, and the
referents of indicative sentences to be their ranges of values. See also his 1892b, p. 193. Fine 2008, p. 17, ﬀ. points to the
sense/reference distinction for deﬁnitions with referential import vs. deﬁnitions with semantical import respectively.
For a study of the constructive notion of reference based on the Fregean analysis, see Primiero 2004.
22 In this line, Fine 2008 claims the nature of Hume’s Principle (and thus of the abstraction principle) to be more than just
a principle deﬁning the number operator. He claims that one can consider the principle as determining the domains of
discourse on which abstraction is applied: ‘It is somehow meant to succeed both in telling us what objects there are and
in assigning them to the concepts. [. . .] the principle should determine [the domain] M on the basis of the underlying
subdomain I of individuals (or non-abstracts). Thus the principle must not only determine the operator F as a function
of M, it must also determine M as a function of I’ (Fine 2008, p. 20).
23 The latter is then an ordered pair, corresponding to the notion of a function as a graph; conceptually diﬀerent is the
simple dependent object considered before. In the next section, the notion of function involved in the analysis of type
system will be a diﬀerent one. The clariﬁcation of the distinction among these three notions is due to B.G. Sundholm in
personal conversation.
24 Fine 2008 proposes a Fregean theory of abstraction that aims at solving a number of typical problems, such as the
identity problem, considering an object the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts: ‘Thus the
notion relates three items: an object, which is the result of abstraction; a ﬁrst-order concept, which is what is
abstracted; and a second-order relation on concepts, which is the means of abstraction. In the case of numbers, for
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The problematic applications of the Comprehension Principle rest on this
conceptual priority of the meaning-function over the satisfaction value. Cases of
paradoxical applications are due to the fact that extensions of concepts are
themselves among the abstracts and therefore each extension should be identiﬁed
with the class of concepts that have that extension. Notoriously, by treating ranges of
values as ordinary objects, Frege allows a function to be applied to its very same
course-of-values (corresponding to a function applied to its own graph). In
‘Funktion und Begriﬀ’, Frege avoids this paradox of the Begriﬀsschrift by
considering a ﬁrst-level and a second-level form of abstraction, producing diﬀerent
kinds of functions.25 Thus, essentially the same result of the later Russellian Ramiﬁed
Type Theory (RTT)26 was already at hand in the later developments of his theory of
functions, but treating Wertverla¨ufe as objects undermined the entire project of the
Grundgesetze.
The resolution of the Fregean hypostatization of ranges of values of
propositional functions in RTT is hidden in the derivation of the latter from a
hierarchy of types. In the construction of propositional functions, Russell makes use
of the substitution of variables by suitable arguments and this obviously requires that
(some form of) the Fregean Abstraction Principle has been previously applied.27
The interesting case in the structure of Ramiﬁed Type Theory is represented by
the construction of propositional functions from propositions with the use of
abstraction. The basic language is built up by the basic sets of individuals,
I¼ {a1, a2, . . .}; variables, V¼ {x, y, z, . . .}, with a strict relation 5deﬁned over V;
and functions R, together with an arity-deﬁning map a :R!N. When one considers
the type of variables bound by quantiﬁcation, the structure of ramiﬁed types is
introduced: propositions are of order 0, and all quantiﬁcational expressions over
basic propositions have to be of higher order. Thus, types and orders (a natural
number) are introduced: O0 is a ramiﬁed type; if (t1(a1) . . . tn(an)) are ramiﬁed types,
with a2N, a4 max(a1, . . ., an) a ramiﬁed type is (t1(a1) . . . tn(an))a where a¼ 1 þ
max(a1, . . ., an). All minimal ramiﬁed types are predicative types.
The result of abstraction seems to be again the functional empty structure to be
fulﬁlled by proper arguments in place of the variables, producing appropriate
objects. But the famous restrictive principle of impredicative deﬁnitions is then
applied: whatever involves all of a collection cannot be taken as a part of it (Vicious
Circle Principle). In the development of the relevant notion of function for this
system of predication, an important conceptual change has occurred: the connection
between predication and concepts as abstract entities is forgotten, being replaced by
the notion of predicate, which represents the stable part of the abstraction procedure
in terms of functions. Correspondingly, the abstraction procedure for the formation
of propositional functions is the basis of RTT, which maintains the double hierarchy
of simple types and of orders, where the diﬀerence is expressed by the diﬀerent
evaluation objects (arguments) they are satisﬁed by.
example, we may say that 0 is the abstract of the empty concept with respect to the relation of one-one correspondence’
(Fine 2008, p. 28).
25 Frege 1891, pp. 26–27.
26 Russell 1908 and Whitehead & Russell 1910–12.
27 For a complete historical overview on type theory, starting from RTT, see Kamareddine et al. 2004.
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The thesis that abstraction has now a rather diﬀerent nature and plays a diﬀerent
role is conﬁrmed by the understanding of generality for functions as interpreted by
Russell. In RTT, two forms of abstraction are thus introduced:
1. Abstraction from parameters: For any propositional function f on predicative
types (t1(a1) . . . tn(an))
a within domain of variables , a new propositional
function f0((t1(a1) . . . tnþ1(anþ1))
max(a,anþ1þ1) – where tnþ1(anþ1) is a new
predicative type – is obtained by replacing all propositional and individual
variables the function can range over with equal variables within a new
domain 0 that contains all previous variable plus the needed new ones;
2. Abstraction from propositional functions: For any propositional function f on
predicative types (t1(a1) . . . tn(an))
a with free variable y1 5 . . .5yn, a new
propositional function f 0(y15 . . .5yn)((t1(a1) . . . tn(an))
a)aþ1 within domain 0
is obtained by constructing a higher-order predication on the possible values
of f.
The deﬁnition of equality for abstraction from parameters is dependent on the strict
order 5 on the variables, so that the list of variables is ordered and diﬀerence in
order deﬁnes diﬀerent functions: in turn, appropriate substitution procedures
preserving strict order deﬁne the set of equivalent functions. The second form of
abstraction is the one needed to obtain higher-order propositional functions, and it
uses higher-order variables. In the ﬁrst case, one refers to apparent variables (the
function is always true); in the second, to real variables (any value of the function is
asserted). The notion of abstraction which leads to functions as independent objects
(and in turn to contradiction whenever the appropriate hierarchy of predications is
not considered) acts on the values (real variables), what Russell called a proper
‘propositional function’.28 Thus the type of a function depends not only on the type
of arguments, but rather also on the type of apparent variables (place-holders).29
Typing procedures introduced by Russell are not just the solution to the problem
of impredicativity: they present a new interpretation of the notion of function and a
diﬀerent approach to abstraction. In particular, the latter requires an explanation of
the role of types as objects of a higher level. This can already be seen in the restriction
on the formulation of propositional functions provided by the deﬁnition of
appropriate contexts , 0 for the allowed types.
The traditional interpretation of the notion of function due to Leibniz, Bernoulli
and Euler, is that of an analytical expression in one or more variables. Frege and
Russell formulated the logical notion based on the relation of predication, which
refers to substitution and evaluation as its deﬁning operations. In the Fregean
interpretation a function also stands by itself as an independent object of individual
type, deﬁned by the correlation to its course of values. By the Russellian Theory of
Types, functions as formal structures of predication are admissible on the basis of the
order of their objects, and thus strictly depend on their evaluations. This evolution
28 Russell 1908, p. 157.
29 A condition which Russell notoriously restricted by formulating the Axiom of Reducibility (AR): for each formula f
there is a formula g with a predicative type such that f and g are logically equivalent, where a type is predicative if none
of its objects are of a higher order than the order of the elements of the class to which that object should belong. The
meaning of this principle for the determination of the range of a variable is crucial to the later understanding of
abstraction procedures, and it shall be reconsidered in relation to type systems and the methodological clariﬁcation of
the last section.
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has led to a diﬀerent model of function, which deeply inﬂuenced the notion of type: it
restores the old-fashioned notion of function as rule rather than as graph, i.e. it
consists of an operation from an argument to a value. I will now consider this model
of function, in particular by comparing the type-free and the typed versions of
l-calculi: this makes it possible to analyse the related notion of abstraction, and to
introduce the connection between functions and the modern notion of logical types.
4. Abstraction in type-free k-systems
Abstraction has been progressively formalized by means of functional expressions:
propositional functions a` la Russell replaced Fregean concepts, and real variables took
the place of the abstraction procedure. This change is further exempliﬁed in l-calculi,
ﬁrst developed by Church in his 1940 combining the Russellian calculus and the
operation of deramiﬁcation which removes all the orders on types.
In a type-free structure the objects of study are both functions and arguments; the
alphabet of such a calculus is formed by l-terms, which are formal expressions for
functions and for applications of functions. A type-free l-system uses variables as the
basic terms of the calculus. The set of so-called pre-terms of a type-free l-system is
composed of variables, abstraction on variables and application on variables.30
Abstraction consists in moving from the expression M to lx.M, expressing the
function x 7!M, from a set of variables to a formula. The formula lx(lyM) expresses
the nested abstraction over x over y with respect to expression M: its meaning is that
of a function that maps any argument to a function (e.g. taking the function from
any argument to itself, one deﬁnes the identity function). On the other hand,
application consists in moving from two expressions M and N to the term MN,
expressing the result of M(N) (which provides an instance of a predication). The
operation of b-reduction allows for going from the abstracted term lx.M applied
to argument N to M[x/N], which expresses the substitution of N in place of
free occurrences of x in M. The deﬁnition of equivalence classes on the evaluation
of pre-terms deﬁnes the closure operation on l-terms of the type-free l-system.
This standard analysis of the operations of abstraction and instantiation within a
type-free l-system shows immediately that the related notion of abstraction provides
no connection to abstract terms, either semantically or ontologically deﬁned.
Moreover, it is precisely the type-free structure that led to interpreting the functional
model in terms of graphs: in the language no theoretical distinction between function
and argument is formulated, one considers both an expression FA which denotes the
data F considered as algorithm applied to the input A, and the expression FF that
denotes F applied to itself. In this kind of language, everything actually is or is meant
to represent a function, based on a composed process:31
– Abstraction: consists in the replacement of a part of an expression by means of
a variable element, the process called functionalization;
– Application: consists in the substitution of a certain value in place of the
variable, to form a new expression, and accounts for the process of
computation of its output.
30 For a full introduction to type-free and typed l-systems, the standard reference is Barendregt 1984.
31 See e.g. Laan 1997, pp. 4–5.
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The combination of the two parts is essential to the formulation of a function, and
application is in fact the main operation, whereas abstraction is complementary. The
other relevant operation is, notoriously, reduction, consisting of the process of
computing from a l-abstracted term to its value. The usual procedure of evaluation is
not, here, the one of application (that we have seen to induce only a procedure as
argument of another procedure): the process of calculating values is obtained by b-
reduction M! b N.
The model of abstraction at hand in these languages is diﬀerent when compared
with the one holding for the Fregean notion of function, especially because of the
type-free nature of the terms. The result of abstraction is performed by an operator,
and it produces a function rather than being a function formalizing a predicate or a
concept. Consider the numerical expression 2þ 3, and its transformation into a
function, by which one takes into account ﬁrst the l-term (lx.xþ 3)2 which is the b-
expansion of the given numerical expression: in this transformation we have an
argument (2) replaced by the argument-variable (x) via the l-abstractor. What is
peculiar in this operation is that one already has the abstracted term (which in turn
performs the role of an abstractor operator on values) without necessarily having the
starting term which is abstracted: the operation of removing an argument as a
function construction process is reinterpreted as the application of b-expansion to a
l-term. Instantiation corresponds to application plus b-reduction of the function.32
The peculiar property in this form of abstraction is the conceptual identity between
the predicative part and the argument, so that everything is an operation. In this
sense, there is no term representing the result of an abstraction procedure, nor a term
determining the (semantic) context of predication.
The abstraction operators are such that they can be applied to functions without
considering the order of progressively higher types: the abstraction is a pure
operation, not a complete process. And functions are ﬁrst-class citizens. The resulting
notion of function for these calculi is therefore considered in terms of evaluation
(function values), rather than in terms of objects (abstract functions). In other words,
no (standardly interpreted) function-object distinction prevails and abstraction is a
primary operation only along with application. Moreover, the deﬁnition of
abstraction requires as its basis the notion of b-normal form of a l-term which
corresponds to a propositional function (by the calculus such expression in normal
form is unique, if it exists); then the set of abstractions of a propositional formula
corresponds to the set of b-expansions of the corresponding l-term.
In the following section, I shall consider the eﬀect of reintroducing types in such a
l-system. One way to look at this step is to consider the reduction of the abstraction
process to procedural semantics. If such a task has to be accomplished, one has to
explain how a ‘procedural’ meaning determines the abstract terms corresponding to
the objects deﬁned.
5. Abstraction for typed k-systems
The formulation of the typed version of l-calculi aﬀects the simple version in an
essential way: the range or domain of l-terms reverts to being ﬁxed (i.e. typed), as in
standard mathematical functions. That is, a typed l-term is again a function,
for example, from natural numbers to natural numbers n! n2. In this way the
32 Laan 1997, p. 43.
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operation of l-abstraction in the typed version strengthens the role of the function/
object structure: abstraction is contentual, within a deﬁnite meaning-determiner.
From this perspective, there is a historical event that eﬀected the relation between
abstraction and meaning in the evolution of typed l-calculi, namely the diﬀerent
versions introduced by Curry (1934) and Church (1940)33.
I shall in the following use a standard vocabulary for the language of typed l-
calculi: a set of type variables {a, b, . . . } with corresponding arbitrary types T¼ {t1,
t2, . . . }; a set of contexts (also called bases) C¼ {x1 : t1, . . . , xn : tn}, with domain of a
context ¼ {x1, . . . ,xn} given by members of the set of variables in the l-terms
L : {M, N, . . . }, and its range by the set of simple types.
In typed systems a` la Curry, a typability relation is deﬁned among the sets of
contexts, l-terms and simple types by rules for instantiation of a member of a context
(start-rule), l-abstracted term (introduction) and application (elimination); the
system is completed by a standard b-contraction rule. A context is a set of
assumptions stating that certain elements have certain types, and this is used to build
type expressions of the abstraction and application kind.
In the typed l-calculus a` la Church, on the other hand, one starts from a
(denumerable) set of l-terms, variables and the set of simple types. This formulation
of the language has an explicit declaration of type for each variable, whereas in the
system a` la Curry the type of a function is inferred from the related environment. In
the explicitly typed form of expressions, every term of the calculus now has a normal
form, i.e. all possible b- and Z-reductions terminate, which makes the set of typable l-
terms entirely recursive. Church-style languages are thus based on the correspondence
between terms and types, i.e. the deﬁnition of the latter in terms of the former. The
rules for the formation of abstracted and applied terms reﬂect the typability relation:
; x : t1
..
.
M : tn
 ‘ lx : t1:M : tn : t1 ! tn
 ‘ M : t1 ! tn
..
.
 ‘ N : t1
 ‘ MN : tn:
ð2Þ
The ﬁrst rule (Abstraction) says that from a context  and assumption of type t1,
if one derives a term M of type tn, then one obtains the term of functions from t1 to
tn by l-abstraction: for each term M : tn and each variable x : t1, (lx : t1.M : tn) : t1 !
tn is a term. The second rule (Application) brings back this abstracted term to a
function of instantiated terms: for each couple of terms in context, M : t1! tn and
N : t1, the application (MN) : tn is a term.
The formulation of the typed version of l-calculi follows intuitively the Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation: a proof of an implication is a
construction, and a construction of an implication is a function. Thus, the end
formula of a derivationP is the type ofP; application corresponds to modus ponens,
i.e. by the applicationMN one will intendM to be a function type of the form t1! tn,
N to be of type t1 and the result to be of type tn; and abstraction can be seen as the
discharging of assumptions in natural deduction. It is in view of the role of assump-
tions in abstraction processes that a new understanding of this procedure is developed.
When considering this formulation of the abstraction rule, a relevant
distinguishing feature among the two formulations of typed l-systems appears: in
33 See Sorensen and Urzyczyn 2006, especially sections 3.1–3.3.
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the version formulated by Church, abstractions have declared domains, so that they
assume the form lx : tM, for x in the set of variables of type t, abstracted with
respect to expressionM; on the other hand, in Curry-style systems, abstractions have
no domain, that is they are of the form lx.M. In these systems an extremely
important conceptual shift is therefore related to the notion of abstraction: the
bound variables formulated in environments convey abstract information related to
the term syntax. l-systems a` la Church provide ﬁxed types for all variables (in terms
of their typing contexts) and terms, and expressions contain full type information
(whereas a so-called type-assignment system Curry-style would not have such full
information in the basic syntax). The procedure that allows transforming a fully built
term into a core one, i.e. one providing only the necessary type information where
every pseudo-term induces a type-free l-term, can be seen as an operation of erasing
the domain of information: this is the newly formulated idea of an abstraction
process. Conversely, the typability of terms (based on the Curry–Howard isomor-
phism) consists of ﬁlling in a proof-trace with the missing formulas. Hence,
contextual information describes the relevant data type under which a given
reduction terminates.
I shall in the following deﬁne this abstract informational data contained in
contexts as the process of forgetting data-constructions. According to this relation
between the informational content of terms and the procedures of abstraction, one
needs now to distinguish between two diﬀerent uses of ‘abstraction’:
. l–abstraction terms consist in proof-steps by generalization, formulating
function types;
. Abstract informational data is the set of terms obtained by procedures of
abstraction from an existential type.
This distinction is clearly based on the logical nature of types as logical objects of
higher degree and the formulation of abstraction in terms of dependent term-
constructions.34 In the following, I will analyse further this connection, aiming to
establish further links between the logical notion of type, the procedure of
abstraction and the epistemic notion of information.
6. Dependent type systems and applications
The formulation of typed versions of l-systems suggests a new logical form of
abstraction procedures: from a process based on predication and determining the
notion of function, abstraction has become the representation of a functional term
(via predication) which refers to external assumptive data. The crucial step in this new
34 It is important to notice here – especially with respect to the analysis provided in the next sections – that the
formation of classes of type constructors depending on terms has no computational diﬀerence with respect to the
class of non-dependent types in constructive systems. As shown in Berardi 1990, this dependence corresponds to
the coding of high-order proofs in ﬁrst-order arithmetic: this result is proved by showing that typable terms and
representable functions are the same with and without type dependence; that the strong normalization property is
equivalent with and without type dependence; and that the set of logical theorems of a given l-calculus is
characterized by proving that a logic with type dependence (even if it can prove some new theorems) is equivalent
to a logic without type dependence. It will be my aim to show in the following section in which sense the
dependency relation is conceptually relevant for the notion of predication and abstraction when interpreted in
terms of informational abstract data.
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interpretation of the notion of abstraction is represented by the use of contexts for
type declarations, and the related formulation of the languages for dependent types.
The mutual dependency between types and terms in such languages is given in the
form of terms depending on terms, and terms depending on types; but also, types
depending on terms and types depending on types. The formulation of dependent
types is therefore interesting because it shows two diﬀerent forms of abstract terms
for dependency: on the one hand, in a reduced functional expression F : t1! t2, such
that M : t1, the term FM : t2 depends on the term M; on the other hand, a
generalization on variable types M : 8x.a! a implies that the term Ma : a! a
depends on the variable type a. This dependency applies also to higher degrees,
provided functional abstraction holds both on FM : t2 depending on the termM, and
on Ma : a! a depending on the variable type a.35
The dependency of types on types tells another story: the deﬁnition of a
functional l-term f¼ la.a! a requires the variable type a as its dependency relation.
Formally, this amounts to saying that one should be able to ﬁnd a constant for any
instance of variable types a,b such that a functional relation f¼ a! b is in that
constant. One way of seeing this is precisely to assume objects of higher degree with
respect to both terms and types, so called kinds. For any term M in type t, then M is
called the constructor of kind k, provided t : k.36 The introduction of kinds recalls
explicitly the formulation of higher-order meaning determining objects, which claim
a conceptual priority over the instances.
A diﬀerent form of dependency is that of types on terms. Provided t is a type and
k its kind, then the function t! k will be a kind. Given the functional abstraction
f : t! (k0 2 k), where k0 is a constant in the kind k, and one predication of term M : t,
a function fM : k0 is a term-dependent type (namely dependent on M).
It will be by means of the constructive strengthening of this dependency of types
on types and terms (namely: accepting the deﬁnition of types by terms along with the
conceptual presupposition of types by terms) that a complete procedural view on
abstraction is reached. There is a common trait in the dependency of types on terms
and types that relates to the notion of abstraction (in its double interpretation). Kind
formation, type formation and term formation (predication), are all expressible
within contexts of abstract data. This opens a completely new perspective, and it
can be entirely expressed in the procedural formulation: the role of the meaning-
determining abstract terms is entirely reduced to the procedure of reconstructing
appropriate abstract information. The notion of abstract data in context
corresponds – informally – to the conditions that allow predications to be
performed. However, these formulas in context cannot be intended as arbitrary
assumptions: rather, one needs to know that the related applications are legal. This
reduces to the very simple observation that application justiﬁes both functional
abstraction and the abstraction on data types in the structure of context assumptions.
This is what I shall call the procedural view on abstraction.
The polymorphic (second-order) typed l-calculus, introduced independently by
Girard (1972) and Reynolds (1974), is standardly obtained by adding to the language
variables ranging over predicates, sets of functions and allowing quantiﬁcation over
35 See e.g. Barendregt 1993, p. 82.
36 This is for example the structure of the language lo in Barendregt 1993, where the constant ¤ (not part of the
language) is such that k :¤ means that k is a kind, is introduced as an axiom, and the introduction of types is given as
members of kinds.
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such variables. In formulating the second-order level of typed l-calculi therefore,
once again the usual operation of abstraction by generalized quantiﬁcation over type
variables is applied: type variables are types; the set of functions t1! t2 is a type,
provided t1, t2 are types; and given type t and type variable a, then 8at(a) is a type.
The role of the standard application process can again be expressed in terms of the
BHK interpretation: a construction of 8at(a) is a function that leads from every
construction of a to a construction of t1(t2). The obvious remark here is that the class
of formulas the quantiﬁers can be taken to range over consists of the full set of
second-order propositional formulas (that is including all types), so that the meaning
of a formula 8at(a) can be taken to be determined by all formulas satisﬁed by the
substitution operation of the type variable a with a type constant t, including the
cases where this constant might be of the same or higher complexity than 8at(a)
itself: this obviously leads to impredicativity of second-order logic. But it is the
reference to constructions that becomes crucial here: quantiﬁers range over deﬁnable
types, namely those for which a construction method is provided. Well-typed l-terms
are thus obtained by inference rule formulated under context of assumptions,
ordinary abstraction, polymorphic abstraction or type application.
Polymorphic abstraction (with its counterpart type application) is now the crucial
element to look at. Polymorphic abstraction La.M consists in taking a term M as a
polymorphic procedure with respect to type parameter a. The introduction of the
mechanism of parameters for deﬁning access procedures (for example to the
induction axiom, usually done in order to settle a diﬀerence between developers and
users, a distinction which has been essentially produced by the AUTOMATH
system) requires that abstraction be allowed only if always followed immediately by
application;37 thus, once again, the abstraction procedure cannot be considered by
itself as eventually producing any kind of abstract object, it consists rather in the
forgetting procedure on data construction. For the other standard inference rules
(introduction, application, elimination), the very same property is reﬂected by the
requirement that such a rule induces a proper term if free variables in the context are
typed. Notice that this is an undecidable problem: it cannot be decided if the problem
‘Given a type t, is there a closed term for t?’ has in general a solution for the
polymorphic l-calculus.
These formal considerations lead to the formulation of two main levels of
abstraction: the ﬁrst is represented by taking variable types and allowing quantiﬁcation
over them; the second is clearly represented by allowing derivations to be performed
on the assumption of abstract data types being reduced to term expressions.
In the direction of the ﬁrst notion of abstraction went the idea of prototype proof,
ﬁrst formulated by Herbrand.38 A prototype proof is, brieﬂy, the proof of a universally
quantiﬁed statement, whose veriﬁcation is applicable to each speciﬁc instance of the
quantiﬁed variable. It is executed by assuming a certain generic element of the set the
quantiﬁcation ranges over, in this way making the proof independent from that speciﬁc
element, but rather dependent only on the assumption that that certain element for
which the proof is done belongs to the same set the quantiﬁer is ranging over.39
37 See Laan 1997, p. 224.
38 See Herbrand 1971, pp. 288–89 and the related analysis in Longo 2000.
39 Longo 2000 provides a reading of the notion of prototypic proof in type systems under the propositions-as-types
interpretation, where one can consider this kind of proofs as l-terms: this is done by considering a simple type called
generic, i.e. such that it can be assumed as a variable, and whose proof is provided by a speciﬁc instance called
‘parametric’, i.e. which can be uniformly substituted.
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On the other hand, we can interpret abstract data types (ADT) as models. ADT
are deﬁned as a set of data values (abstract data structure) and associated
operations (interface) considered independently by any speciﬁc implementation.
These data represent the result of an operation of abstraction intended as the
process of deleting unnecessary details from necessary characteristics in order to
solve a problem (i.e. to provide the correct operations on a certain set of data).
This operation aims at deﬁning data relevant to the problem plus the operations
which are to be executed. Clearly, the process of obtaining the relevant data is
exempliﬁed by the abstract predicates entering into the solution of the problem; as
in the case of the application function, this process of abstraction is never taken
separately from the determination of those operations which are to be performed
on the empty schema. A syntax obtained by induction on the structure of datatypes
is known as polytipic abstraction: by this term one understands formalizations and
veriﬁcations abstracted with respect to a large class of datatypes, which is especially
relevant in functional programming. A simple example is that of the function map
in the Hindler–Miller type system (map: 8A, B.(A!B)! (list(A)! list(B))) which
provides a structure of transformation of data lists into other kinds of data, an
untouched schema, irrelevant to the kind of data instantiated as object of that
function.40 Polytipic constructions can be used not only to deﬁne functions in a
generic way, but rather also to formally state polytypic theorems and to synthesize
polytypic proof-objects in a formal way. In this case one is dealing with a
procedure of abstraction by which an empty model is obtained, to implement all
the diﬀerent data of a certain range of (diﬀerently) equivalent types, and to be used
in terms of application: this model is intended to abstract from (in the sense of
assuming) all the information needed to implement the construction. This
obviously requires that the basic distinction between monomorphic and poly-
morphic languages holds, so that even a notion of universal polymorphism can be
formulated as a function that works on a range of variables having a common
structure.41
The analysis developed about abstraction for l-systems, and in particular for
their typed versions, has shown some relevant intuitions about this notion. These can
be summarized as follows:
. Functional abstraction and application on types of ordered degrees present the
structure of an empty model and its fulﬁllment, originated with the Fregean
interpretation of predication by function;
. This compound structure provides a deﬁnitional procedure for terms rather
than building an abstract term or object, like in the case of the function–
concept structure;
. This stresses the procedural approach and avoids the ontological/metaphysical
implications on abstraction.
In this analysis, diﬀerent notions of abstraction are determined by the distinction
between abstraction for types of higher order and abstraction as the empty
40 See Pfeifer & Ruess 1998 and Pfeifer & Ruess 1999.
41 An example of application is given by the so-called parametric polymorphism, according to which the same object or
function can be used uniformly in diﬀerent type contexts without changes (provided all data are represented). See
Cardelli & Wegner 1985, p. 477.
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formulation of constructions with respect to a context of expressions in dependent
types. In this way, one is led to approach the notions of abstraction and instantiation
at distinct levels, where a full explanation for the epistemic meaning of this second
form of abstraction is still apparently missing. It is in the reformulation of the
problem of meaning in terms of information that the circle closes again.
7. Constructive types and abstraction
Among the formulations of dependent type theories, the intuitionistic version
given by Martin-Lo¨f is probably the best model to explore the connection between
abstraction and procedural semantics, and to consider the role that contexts for
dependent predications play with respect to this topic. The aim of the present section
is to analyse the relation between (dependent) predication and meaning.42
The constructive version of type theory (CTT) is equipped with a conceptual and
semantic frame that provides an interpretation for the procedural approach to
abstraction, restoring the link between types and abstract semantic terms.
Abstraction for such a theory provides a more general methodological approach:
the epistemic notion of information shall be used to formulate it. The core thesis is
that the syntactical (rule-based) procedures do not fully explain the notion of
abstraction involved by types. On the one hand, the removal operation by which the
notion of empty (polymorphic) model is obtained, and on the other hand, the notion
of abstract (meaning-determining and predicative-component) object involved by the
deﬁnition of types themselves are the two distinct aspects which we shall consider.
The procedural semantics on dependent types is the bridge between them.
At the syntactic predicative level, the notion of functional abstraction is satisﬁed
in terms of rules. Those regarding abstraction and application concern the
informative content of expressions in terms of the related constructions, strictly
following the BHK-interpretation seen for the typed versions of l-calculi.
Abstraction and application refer to the standard syntax of categorical and
dependent judgments. The foundational perspective in CTT is epistemic and the
starting point for introducing types is represented by predications. Types are given by
the propositions-as-types principle and the sets-as-props identity. In the following I
shall use Greek capital letters , D, . . . as metavariables for contexts of assumptions;
Latin capital letters A, B, . . . for metavariables for types; small Latin letters a, b, . . .
for proof-objects and x1, x2, . . . as proof-variables. Both propositions and sets are
justiﬁed by appropriate judgments, rightfully asserted if and only if one knows
respectively an element of the set or a proof for the proposition A; moreover, one
needs to know how to establish equality among such objects:
A : set
A : prop
a : A
a ¼ b : A:
42 The full formulation of CTT by Martin-Lo¨f is spread over a number of papers and talks given at various conferences.
For the purpose of this paper,Martin-Lo¨f 1984 andMartin-Lo¨f 1993 represent the basic references. A full introduction
to the syntax and semantics of CTT is contained in the ﬁrst chapter of Primiero 2008.
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Two such types will be equal (A¼B : set/prop) when they have same objects for which
the same equality relation holds. To know an element in this setting is equivalent
with formulating a construction. This extends to dependent judgments:
ðx1 : A1; . . . ; xn : AnÞ
a : A
which states that a is a construction for the set/proposition A, provided the set of
assumptions is veriﬁed, i.e. that appropriate constructions have been substituted for
variables: ([x1/a1] :A1, . . . , [xn/an] :An).
43
The set J of judgments is therefore deﬁned by the formula formation rules
establishing that any expression of the form a:A (categorical judgment) is a formula
whenever a is a proof-constant of A in the set of propositional contents; and any
expression of the form (x1 :A1, . . . ,xn :An)a :A (hypothetical judgment) is a formula
whenever a is a proof-constant of A in the set of propositional contents, provided
that x1, . . . , xn are proof-variables for A1, . . . , An and substitution with proper
constructions are performed.
P-introduction is the rule to construct an independent object of the lowest
individual type by the following derivation:
ðx : AÞ
bðxÞ : BðxÞ
lððxÞbðxÞÞ : ðPx : AÞBðxÞ
ð3Þ
which says that if x is a variable of the type A and b(x) is a term of the type B(x) (i.e.
dependent on the term x in A), then a canonical element in A can be abstracted
belonging to any of the elements in B. In this rule, functional abstraction in the sense
of l-calculi is at hand. The related rule of P-elimination (Application) will be
respectively as follows:
b : ðPx : AÞBðxÞ a : A
bðaÞ : BðaÞ ð4Þ
Formation of functions of higher type is instead obtained by a diﬀerent form of
abstraction:
ðx : AÞ
b : B
ðxÞb : A ! B
ð5Þ
which says that if x is a variable of type A and b is a term of type B, then (x)b is a
term of type A!B; this is explained by the ordinary b-rule, expressing what it means
to apply an abstraction to an object in A:
a : A b : Bðx : AÞ
ððxÞbÞðaÞ ¼ b½x=a : B½x=a : ð6Þ
43 Here and in the following, round brackets are used for contents in contexts, whereas square brackets are used for the
substitution procedures within contexts.
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The explanation of these rules provide the proper distinction between universalization
and (informational) abstraction on contents. The procedures of abstraction and
instantiation express their contents in terms of information for the relevant
constructions. The object of abstraction is here the informative content of constructions
for judgements:
Principle 1 (Forget–Restore Principle (Sambin & Valentini 1998)) To build up an
abstract concept from a raw ﬂow of data, one must disregard some information, and an
abstraction is constructive when the information forgotten can be restored at will.
Under this interpretation, abstraction corresponds to an operation of forgetting from
computational information, whereas instantiation means restoring such information.
In particular, by a procedure of abstraction one obtains the transition from the
monomorphic to the polymorphic versions of the theory. This explanation represents
the constructive counterpart of the principles of functional abstraction seen for typed
l-calculi.
How this notion of abstraction relates to predication and meaning in CTT is
explained by giving a closer look at the sets-as-props identity. The philosophical
basis of CTT is entirely given by such formal identity prop set: the formulation of
any judgment of the form A : set/prop is justiﬁed by the appropriate construction, but
it relies – from the point of view of the concepts involved – on the introduction of the
notions of propositions and sets as categories of predication. To this aim, their
formal expression is given by the use of appropriate axioms
prop : cat
set : cat
where cat stands for the predicative category. It is in view of the relation between the
introduction of types as categories and their justiﬁcation as constructions that the
link with meaning is hereafter analysed.
By insisting on the procedure of abstraction in terms of removing the
informational content of the constructions, one provides the judgment declaring
truth of the involved types:
a : A
A true
: ð7Þ
This formulation simply expresses the propositions-as-sets interpretation, assuming
that an appropriate presupposition for the ﬁrst judgment is the introduction of A as
either prop or set44 and a multi-level typed l-calculus can be provided for rigorous
treatment of judgments of the form ‘A true’, on the basis of canonical expressions of
the form a :A. In this sense, abstraction procedures of this form allow for type-
expressions of the form A : cat
A : setð=propÞ
A : cat
ð8Þ
where abstraction applies on the construction justifying the judgment that A is a set
(a proposition). From the procedural point of view, this corresponds to an
44 Cf. Nordstro¨m, Petersson & Smith 1990, p. 37.
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abstraction from the speciﬁc data type; its justiﬁcation is entirely based on the
appropriate construction, it corresponds to a speciﬁcation, a procedure of
instantiation, with the same structure as in ADT or in polytipic abstraction.
As formulated by the Forgetting–Restore Principle, information is the content of
such procedures: in other words, the procedural semantics at the basis of CTT does
not only allow for the removal of irrelevant data (as in the case of the constructions
for the assumptions); it also allows abstraction from instances of concepts.
Abstraction, in this sense, formulates the ‘routine’ from the intensional to the
extensional level, corresponding to the model of a construction; instantiation
(application) goes from the extensional to the intensional level, corresponding to the
ﬁlling of an empty structure. The explanation of this abstraction procedure is
determined by the relation between the syntactic deﬁnition and the semantic
introduction of types, and it has to be given accordingly to the syntactic-semantic
method of CTT. It corresponds to the thesis according to which there is a level at
which types can be considered conceptually anterior to their objects, even though it is
at the level of constructions only that the meanings of the former are explained.
This procedure leads to the analysis of types as objects of possible predication.
This informal deﬁnition corresponds, in the formal lanugage of CTT, to judgments
intended as presuppositions for expressions. The interesting aspect for the theory of
abstraction concerns the fact that the meaning (justiﬁcation) of a judgment A : set/
prop relies on its construction a :A, whereas the possibility of using its information
content (for example in a context of assumptions) is given by the (justiﬁed)
presupposition A : cat. In other words: on the one hand the semantic explanation of a
judgment is given by the related instantiation and non-trivial identity ( . . . :A); on the
other hand, its use as a meaningful object of predication is possible in terms of its
introduction as a meaning category ( . . . : cat). The category declaration is therefore
justiﬁed by the syntactic deﬁnition of types in terms of constructions; known types
can instead be used as predicables, that is as terms apt to be predicated. This
structure preserves in the ﬁrst instance the notions of knowledge as predication and
predicability as possibility of knowledge.
In the order of the real the abstraction procedure allows erasing information from
arbitrary elements of well-deﬁned types, i.e. abstraction is justiﬁed by the well-
foundedness of predicative expressions with substitution and non-trivial identities.
According to the epistemic formulation, to know a certain object (to formulate a
construction) is the way a set is known to be inhabited, or a proposition is known to
be true. At the (programming-)language level, such a distinction is reﬂected by the
one between Data Type as a certain type given in terms of introduction rules for
inductively generating canonical values of that type, and Abstract Data Type as the
general structure allowing one to build a speciﬁc data type. This means that one does
not obtain types at the conceptual level by means of abstraction, rather they are
existent on the basis of their constructions and from these the process of asserting a
type to be true is obtained by means of abstraction:
INTENSIONAL
Abstraction # Knowledge
EXTENSIONAL
Higher types, i.e. types of the monomorphic kind, are explained instead as ‘abstract
terms’ insofar as they provide a connection between predication and semantic context.
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In the order of concepts, the nature of types is prior to objects, they can be clariﬁed as
meaningful abstract terms, or universal predicables. Where categories make
predication possible, types are to be intended as abstract and purely informational
meaningful entities, in the same way as a function is satisﬁed by its object. Types
intended in this latter sense, i.e. as meaning-objects in the form of abstract entities,
allow one to explain why the ontological question ‘What is a type?’, is complementary
(but reduced to) the epistemic formulation ‘What does it mean to know a type?’:
CONSTRUCTION
Predicability " Application
MODEL
In the following, I will suggest that a suitable interpretation for the meaning entities
of higher order is that of purely informational entities.45 This means that the
introduction of the type of all types – initially suggested by Martin-Lo¨f in the
impredicative version of the theory – is overcome by a diﬀerent conceptual
formulation: the identiﬁcation of propositions and types (and in turn also of sets) is
given in terms of the formulation of the former as a category of predication, which
means that the related quantiﬁcation ranges only over the instances and not over the
category itself.
In a slogan: the deﬁnition of types in terms of constructions implements the
‘meaning is use’ approach; the notion of category as informational entity allows one
to extend it to a ‘meaning in use’ approach.
8. Abstraction as hidden information
Abstraction in dependent languages – and in particular as analysed in CTT – is
neither just the kind of mathematical abstraction that gives rise to models, nor the
form of predicative abstraction obtained by removal of non-universal terms we have
seen at hand in the older philosophical interpretations. In this new logical
framework, meaning and information are linked to each other. And one crucial
paradigm change is the result, namely interaction. This new paradigm of abstraction
is to be found in computer science, a very new form of understanding concepts and
meanings.
The constructive proﬁle of the deﬁnition of abstract terms from the previous
section shows the new interpretation of logical abstraction at hand in CTT. The
essentiality of a concept (in the Aristotelian sense) is no longer given by abstraction
‘that eliminate inessential details’ and that ‘inasmuch as such details constitute
information [represents] information neglect’.46 The strict interplay between types and
their terms (constructions), such that meaning of the former is always given in terms
of the latter, consists of a procedure of information hiding, exempliﬁed by the
requirement of the reconstructibility of contents, substitution procedure on empty
place-holders. Abstraction as a procedure of information hiding shall in the
45 These distinctions are methodologically (other than conceptually) needed, as is shown by the Girard’s Paradox about
the existence of a type of types being an element of itself, established by extending the theory by means of the axiom
U :U. See Girard 1972, further analysed in Coquand 1995. For an elaborate presentation of the inconsistency of type
theory extended with an axiom for higher-order objects, see also Jacobs 1989.
46 Colburn & Shute 2007, p. 176. Emphasis in the original.
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following be further analysed with reference to computer science.47 In parallel with
such a new paradigm, the value of types as abstract terms is here explained not in
their presenting some general emptyness on which their value is based, but rather in
presenting always a ﬁlled (constructed) structure, one that might hide its information,
as in the use of assumptions in context. A context is intended as nothing else than the
load of needed data that is hidden to the user, and that can be recalled at will (as by
the Forgetting–Restore Principle requirement).
In this perspective on abstract terms and abstraction procedures a major
role is therefore played by the explanation of the notion of information. In the
(meta-)language of CTT, the introduction of types corresponds to the introduction of
meaningful informational entities; it expresses the notion of semantic information.
On the other hand, operators and rules apply to syntactic data, whose procedures of
forgetting and restoring consist essentially in saving and deleting syntactic
information. The former notion of information is based on (justiﬁed by) the latter,
but its use can be independent, precisely in virtue of the information hiding kind of
abstraction. Hence, the notion of information represents in CTT an all-invasive
concept related to abstraction and instantiation; it has an epistemic nature, it
provides an abstract term corresponding to a meaningful (predicable) object; it
recovers the steps of predication by reinterpreting removal as forgetting–restoring
constructions, it allows the use of ‘abstract entities’ in terms of meaning. This is the
methodological approach at the basis of the so–called methods of levels of
abstraction.48
Let us refer to our structure of predication as an epistemic system. The system
uses the ‘hidden information’ idea of abstraction to interpret expressions of the
form A : type and x :A. These expressions convey the same meaning that
dependency on types and dependency on terms express in the formulation of the
typed version of l-systems. The expression x :A corresponds to the deﬁnition of a
‘typed variable’49 in a dependent judgment, i.e. a judgment whose construction is
dependent on a term. The related operation of typing is a presupposition for any
such assumption, expressed by a formula of the form A : type and expressing the
dependency on a type. The ‘type value’ is what turns the typed variable into an
observable50 (constructable, predicable): this results in the instantiation of a
predication, or substitution of the variable by a proper construction [x/a :A]
(objects of types). The degree of adequacy of a type corresponds to the formulation
of proper environment g : from which the agent is allowed to extract values to
instantiate variables in context [x :]. In the standard interpretation of the Method
of Abstraction, the input is represented by a set of data, and the output is a model
comprising information. The deﬁnition of a level of abstraction as a ﬁnite but non-
empty set of observables corresponds in our system to a knowledge state. Such a
knowledge state is represented by a predicative structure in which abstract terms
(types/category of predications) are justiﬁed in terms of constructions, following the
procedural semantics. To specify the level of abstraction means to clarify the range
of meaningful concepts and instances of some predication procedure. A level of
abstraction of greater resolution contains more information than a more abstract
47 See Colburn & Shute 2007.
48 See Floridi 2008.
49 See Floridi 2008, p. 305.
50 See Floridi 2008, p. 306.
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one: thus types as meaning objects are purely informational entities, i.e. abstract
terms determining the syntactical information provided by the data, and produced
as output. Data types are here represented either as type-dependency or as
term-dependency: each formulates a diﬀerent level of abstraction. This epistemic
interpretation allows for a full description of epistemic actions in the constructive
frame, in particular by analysing the agent’s state with respect to contents of
information (satisﬁed by the constructive deﬁnition of types) and a weaker
epistemic model given by the abstraction on those truthful contents.51 This allows
one to locate abstraction in an epistemic description of agents’ knowledge
processes, by preserving the connection both to predication and meaning.
The explanation of abstraction as an operation of information hiding can be
further explored: contexts for dependent judgments are ways to display available
computing resources for the agent; their contents express the operations that are
supposed to be achieved if the entire epistemic program has to acquire meaning
(express knowledge), ignoring in practice how they are achieved. The next level of
abstraction is represented by the formulation of distinct agent-based protocols on
contexts, to manage epistemic computational resources in multi-agent networks. To
this aim, the second crucial element of the system is represented by the dynamics
that can be deﬁned on these informational repositories. This shall be a topic for
further research.
9. Conclusions
In the evolution of the history of logic, through the disciplines that share its use,
abstraction has received signiﬁcantly diﬀerent interpretations. There is no under-
standing of this notion without a complete account of these diﬀerences: from the
formulation of empty structures of predications by removal of unnecessary elements,
through the reiﬁcation of abstract terms, to their linguistic formulation as meaning-
determiners. By contrast, the formulation of l-systems and their evolution into type-
theories leads to a new paradigm, whose crucial element is an epistemic
interpretation of the notion of information. This new approach is entirely taken
up by the understanding of abstraction in computer science. The idea of information-
hiding procedure is the basic step to extend the epistemic model of knowledge as
proof-existence in terms of information-communication and exchange. This is
essential for the understanding of the epistemic dynamics modelled by type-theories.
The study of distributed systems from computer science can be a new model to
inspire further evolution in the philosophy of logic.
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